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1 – Introduction
The thesis that a certain arbitrariness occurs in the definition 
of simultaneity was developed by Reichenbach and later by 
Grünbaum. This is known as the conventionality of simulta-
neity thesis (see, e.g. Jammer 2006). In this paper, we will 
take a close look into a particular approach to this thesis, in 
which the analogy with the gauge freedom of electrodynamics 
as adopted in general relativity has a central role. We think 
of the adoption of a particular definition of simultaneity as 
“fixing the gauge” in a context of “gauge freedom” (i.e. in a 
context where different definitions seem to be possible). A 
particularly important notion in the approaches being con-
sidered in this paper is that of an (active) transformation, be 
it a boost or a diffeomorphism, that allows us to set a new 
definition of simultaneity from the definition initially given. 
In section 2, we review briefly the conventionality of sim-
ultaneity thesis as developed by Reichenbach (1924, 1927), 
Grünbaum (1955, 1968), Edwards (1963), and Winnie (1970) 
– which we will refer to as the “tradition”. This provides the 
context in which Anderson and Stedman developed their 
gauge interpretation of the conventionality of simultaneity. 
In section 3, we analysize the work by Anderson and Stedman 
(1977). In section 4, we consider a recent gauge interpretation 
of the conventionality of simultaneity made by Rynasiewicz 
(2012). This section mainly intends to clarify how Rynasiew-
icz’s approach can be reframed in a way that, in our view, has 
fewer tensions than the ones present in Rynasiewicz’s paper. 
In section 5, we first address the issue of the relation of Ry-
nasiewicz’s approach to the previous ones, in particular the 
approaches by Edwards (1963) and Anderson and Stedman 
(1977). Afterwards, we consider the extent to which the gauge 
interpretation is necessary and actually applied by Rynasiew-
icz to address three objections to the conventionality of sim-
ultaneity thesis. We will argue that the gauge interpretation 
is not necessary in any of the cases. In our view, sections 3, 
4, and 5 will clearly reveal three points: synchrony transfor-
mations (boosts) or diffeomorphisms play an excessive role 
in the gauge interpretations; a clear improvement over the 
“tradition” has not been developed; and, an “autonomous” 
argumentation against criticisms for accepting the conven-
tionality of simultaneity remains absent. Section 6 will suc-
cinctly encapsulate – in a “nutshell” – our criticism of the 
gauge interpretations of the conventionality of simultaneity.
2 – The conventionality of 
simultaneity thesis
According to Reichenbach and Grünbaum, the definition 
of distant simultaneity in an inertial reference frame has a 
conventional element in it. This results from the fact that 
causality does not fix uniquely the relation between the 
time coordinates at different positions. Accordingly, the 
coordinate time can be defined by stipulating that t
B
 = tA + 
e (tA’ – tA), where 0 < e < 1 (see, e.g., Reichenbach 1924, pp. 31-
40; Grünbaum 1955, pp. 451-6). Here, tA is the time reading 
at position A when a light signal is sent to position B; t
B
 is the 
time reading at B when the signal arrives; and tA’ is the time 
reading at A when the signal reflected back at B arrives at A. 
Any value of e between 0 and 1 is equally valid. Each choice 
of e corresponds to a particular definition of coordinate time. 
Thinking in terms of clocks located at different positions in 
the inertial reference frame, this corresponds to a particular 
In this work we will consider gauge interpretations of the conventionality of 
simultaneity as developed initially by Anderson and Stedman, and later by Ry-
nasiewicz. We will make a critical reassessment of these interpretations in re-
lation to the “tradition” as developed in particular by Reichenbach, Grünbaum, 
and Edwards. This paper will address different issues, including: the relation 
between these two gauge interpretations; what advantages or defects these 
gauge approaches might have; how “new” Rynasiewicz’s approach in relation 
to the previous ones is; how much of the gauge interpretation Rynasiewicz 
actually applies to deal with objections to the conventionality of simultaneity 
thesis. The conclusion is that the gauge interpretations, in their current formu-
lation, do not provide a better “rationale” of the conventionality of simultaneity 
thesis that supersedes the “tradition”.
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definition of synchronization of distant clocks – we stipulate 
that two clocks are synchronized when verifying t
B
 = tA + e (tA’ 
–tA) for the conventionally adopted e. Einstein’s definition of 
coordinate time – corresponding to the setting of a particular 
relation of distant simultaneity –, is made by setting e = ½ 
(Einstein 1905, p. 142). In this case, the one-way speed of light 
in the positive direction of the x-axis is taken to be identical 
to the one-way speed of light in the negative direction of the 
x-axis.1 For the general (non-standard) case, corresponding 
to e ≠ ½, the one-way speed of light is anisotropic. Grünbaum 
stressed this point:
The conventionality of simultaneity allows but does not 
entail our choosing the same value e = ½ for all directions 
within every system. In each system this choice assures 
the equality of the one-way velocities of light in opposite 
directions by yielding equal one-way transit times […] for 
equal distances. The ratio of these one-way transit times 
is e/(1 – e), and therefore, in the case of e ≠ ½, these 
one-way times are unequal. But […] no fact of nature […] 
would be contradicted if we choose values of e ≠ ½ for 
each inertial system, thereby making the velocity of light 
different from c in both senses along each direction in all 
inertial systems. (Grünbaum 1968, p. 308)
In the general case, the one-way speed of light in the positive 
direction of the x-axis is c
+
 = c/2e and the one-way speed 
of light in the negative direction of the x-axis is c
–
 = c/2(1 
– e), where c is the constant two-way speed of light (see, 
e.g., Winnie 1970, p. 83). We can speak interchangeably 
of the conventionality of simultaneity, conventionality of 
synchronization, or the conventionality of the one-way speed 
of light.
The work by Reichenbach and Grünbaum was extended 
by Edwards (1963) who obtained the generalized Lorentz 
transformations between two inertial reference frames 
R and R’ with any admissible value for e (in the case of R) 
and e’ (in the case of R’). In this paper Edwards gave an 
example, directly in terms of the one-way speed of light, of 
an anisotropic space-time in which a non-standard definition 
of simultaneity was adopted; and while he did not make any 
reference to the line element or metric of an anisotropic 
space-time, he represented in figures the tilted light cone 
structures of anisotropic space-times.2 If we adopt an 
anisotropic one-way speed of light, corresponding to a tilted 
light cone, there are no observable effects. Using Edwards’ 
terminology, quantities that depend on the one-way speed of 
light are not directly observable (Edwards 1963, p. 489).
Edwards was not very explicit regarding the coordinates that 
correspond to a non-standard definition of simultaneity. 
However, when presenting his views in terms of the 
conventionality of the one-way speed of light, Edwards 
considered the case of light being sent from a point O to 
another point A (a distance x apart), which is reflected 
back towards O. In this case, the total time for the process 
tOAO is equal to tOA + tAO. The constant two-way speed of 
light c is related to the one-way speeds in the positive and 
negative directions of the x-axis by 2x/c = x/cOA + x/cAO = x/
c
+
 + x/c
–
 (Edwards 1963, p. 483). Using the expressions for 
c
–
 and c
+
, the expression corresponding to the definition of 
simultaneity for distant points – t
B
 = tA + e (tA’ – tA) – can be 
transformed into what we might consider an expression that 
defines directly the coordinate time: t
B
 = tA + x/c+. Assuming 
that we set the time at O to zero, the expression tA = tO + x/cOA 
reduces to tA = x/cOA. Edwards considered this expression in 
a way closely related to the one employed here: he thinks in 
terms of time intervals (x/cOA and x/cAO), and here we show 
how these time intervals can be determined by considering 
explicitly the coordinate time in the non-standard definition 
of simultaneity. Edwards then went on to impose a causality 
condition that limits the possible values of the one-way speed 
of light (in any direction). This results in having c/2 ≤ c(α, 
β, γ) ≤ ∞, where c(α, β, γ) is the one-way speed of light in the 
direction indicated by the direction cosines α, β, and γ. This is 
equivalent, in terms of Reichenbach’s e-definition, to having 
0 ≤ e ≤ 1.
While it was not necessary, previous to the deduction of the 
generalized Lorentz transformations,  Edwards gave the 
expression of the relation between the time coordinate t
i
 
in the isotropic space-time and the time coordinate t in an 
anisotropic space-time: t = t
i 
– (x/c)X, where X = 1 – c/c
+ 
(Edwards 1963, p. 485).3 This is not a transformation within 
the same inertial reference frame, but between two inertial 
reference frames with different definitions of simultaneity. 
An inertial reference frame with a standard definition of 
simultaneity corresponds to the isotropic space-time, and 
an inertial reference frame with a non-standard definition 
of simultaneity corresponds to an anisotropic space-time. 
In Edwards’ wording, we have two “coordinate systems 
representing these spaces” (Edwards 1963, p. 485). The 
expression t = t
i 
– (x/c)X gives the “relationship between 
the readings of clocks” (Edwards 1963, p. 485), belonging to 
each inertial reference frame (see, e.g., Zhang 1997, pp. 11-3). 
This transformation was not used to deduce the generalized 
Lorentz transformation. However, Edwards referred to the 
possibility of applying it in a sort of heuristic derivation of 
the generalized Lorentz transformations (Edwards 1963, p. 
486).  Moreover, Edwards used this transformation to show 
that the generalized Lorentz transformations reduce to the 
standard Lorentz transformations when also making the 
transformation from the non-standard time coordinates to 
the standard ones (Edwards 1963, p. 487).4
In a closely related work, Winnie gave an alternative derivation 
of the generalized Lorentz transformations and made a 
systematic and important extension of what in Edwards’ 
work was a brief reference to the fact that the time dilation 
formula depended on the adopted definition of simultaneity 
(Edward 1963, p. 489). Winnie showed that the mathematical 
1 - Here, to simplify, we will only consider the (spatial) one-dimensional case.
2 - When adopting Einstein's standard definition of coordinate time, the line element is given by ds2 = (cdt)2 – dx2 – dy2 – dz2 and the metric tensor is orthogonal 
(see, e.g., Zhang 1997, p. 27). When adopting a non-standard definition of coordinate time, the line element is given by ds2 = (cdt + qdx)2 – dx2 – dy2 – dz2, where q 
= 2e – 1, to which is associated a non-orthogonal metric tensor (see, e.g., Zhang 1997, pp. 82-5; Anderson et al. 1998, pp. 106 and 111). Making ds2 = (cdt + qdx)2 – 
dx2 – dy2 – dz2 = 0 we obtain the expression describing the tilted light cone structure mentioned by Edwards (1963, pp. 488-9).
3 - Here, we show the formula for the simplified case of a non-standard synchronization along the x-axis.
4- For this purpose Edwards uses the expressions t’ = t
i
’ – (x’/c)X’ and t = t
i 
– (x/c)X .
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expressions for relative speed, time dilation, and length 
contraction depend on the adopted definition of simultaneity. 
In this way, Winnie generalized the kinematics of special 
relativity for any definition of simultaneity and showed how 
several mathematical expressions depend explicitly on e. 
Like Edwards before him, Winnie deduced the generalized 
Lorentz transformations directly in terms of the relations 
between the coordinates (x, t) of an inertial reference frame 
with an e-definition of simultaneity, and the coordinates (x’, 
t’) of another inertial reference frame in relative motion with 
an e’-definition of simultaneity. Contrary to Edwards, Winnie 
did not mention first the transformation from the time 
coordinate corresponding to e = ½ to the time coordinate for 
an e ≠ ½, nor did he use it to relate the generalized Lorentz 
transformations and the standard Lorentz transformations. 
Also, in a way similar to Edwards, while Winnie was not very 
explicit about the setting of coordinates depending on the 
adopted definition of simultaneity, he did show indirectly the 
expressions for the time coordinate for different definitions 
of simultaneity:
Let us consider a point P moving with a constant speed 
ϑ < c (where e = ½) in the positive direction along the 
x-axis of a frame K. In particular, let us suppose that point 
P moves from A to B in frame K, and as point P coincides 
with A a light beam is sent from A to B ... Let the time (at 
B) of the arrival of the light-beam at B be equal to t
1
 and 
the time (at B) of arrival of the point P at B be equal to t
2
. 
Now if a clock at B is synchronized with a clock at A using 
e = ½, and the time at A of the departures of point P and 
the light-beam is set equal to zero, then clearly t
2 
 = AB/ϑ 
and t
1
 = AB/c. Similarly, for arbitrary permissible values 
of e, t
2 
= AB/ϑe and t1 = AB/c+, where ϑe is the speed of 
point P as determined by a particular choice of e. (Winnie 
1970, pp. 84-5)
t
1
 = AB/c and t
1
 = AB/c
+
 are the time coordinates in an inertial 
reference frame when adopting the standard or non-standard 
definitions of simultaneity (having set the initial time reading 
of the clock at the origin to zero).5
As we have seen, neither Edwards nor Winnie considered 
explicitly the setting of coordinates (t, x) when adopting a 
non-standard definition of simultaneity. This might seem 
to be a secondary issue. However, as we will see, when not 
explicitly accounting for the setting of standard and non-
standard coordinates and considering the transformation 
from the standard to the non-standard coordinates (as, e.g., 
Edwards did), a misinterpretation of the conventionality of 
simultaneity thesis may arise.
3 – The gauge interpretation 
of the conventionality of 
simultaneity
In a paper published in 1977, Anderson and Stedman 
addressed the conventionality of synchronization in terms of 
a gauge freedom in the special theory of relativity. Anderson 
and Stedman’s approach was inspired by Møller’s treatment, 
in general relativity, of the transformation of coordinates in a 
fixed reference frame. In classical electrodynamics, we have 
the so-called gauge freedom that results from the scalar and 
vector potentials (φ, A) : Aµ not being uniquely determined by 
the Maxwell-Lorentz equations. If we make a transformation 
of the potentials of the form A
µ
’ = A
µ
 + ∂ Λ/∂xµ, where Λ(x) is 
an arbitrary scalar function, this leaves the Maxwell-Lorentz 
equations unchanged. We call these transformations gauge 
transformations and say that the theory is gauge invariant 
(see, e.g., Møller 1952, pp. 143-4; Barut 1964, pp. 92-5).
Møller considered the case of a coordinate transformation 
within a reference frame R: x
i
’ = x
i
’(x
k
) and x
0
’ = x
0
’(x
µ
) = 
f(x
µ
), where the spatial coordinates x
i
’ are only function of 
the spatial coordinates x
k
. In this case “the transformation 
simply implies another notation for the points of reference 
in R together with an arbitrary continuous change in the 
rate and setting of the coordinate clocks” (Møller 1952, p. 
236). The gravitational field is left unchanged while the 
gravitational potentials are transformed in a way analogous 
to that of the gauge transformation of electromagnetic 
potentials. This led Møller to refer to this type of coordinate 
transformation, made within the same reference frame, as a 
gauge transformation (Møller 1952, p. 248). Anderson and 
Stedman considered what they called the special relativistic 
synchronization transformation as “the simplest nontrivial 
example” (Anderson and Stedman 1977, p. 29) of general 
relativistic gauge transformations (applied to the case of a 
flat space-time). Let us consider an inertial reference frame 
Ok in which the one-way speed of light is stipulated to be 
anisotropic. In the positive direction of the x-axis it is given 
by c
+
 = c/2e = c/(1 – κ); and in the negative direction of the 
x-axis it is given by c
–
 = c/2(1 – e) = c/(1 + κ), where κ = 2e – 
1. And, let (t0, x0) be the coordinates in an inertial reference 
frame O0 in which we adopt the standard definition of 
simultaneity corresponding to choosing an isotropic one-way 
speed of light. According to Anderson and Stedman:
The introduction of one-way [speed of light] anisotropy 
(O0 → Ok) is equivalent to altering the setting, though 
not the rate, of the coordinate clocks; if the coordinates 
of Oκ are [(tκ, xκ)] ≡ Xμ(κ), then xκ = x0, [ctκ = ct0 + x0κ]. 
We may write this more compactly using a synchrony 
transformation tensor Tμν : X
μ(κ) = Tμν(κ, 0) X
μ(0). 
(Anderson and Stedman 1977, p. 31)6
5 - The spatial coordinates are the same (see, e.g., Zhang 1997, p. 13).
6 - To deduce what Anderson and Stedman call the synchronization or synchrony transformation we can consider the following expressions for the coordinate 
time:  t = t
0
 + x/c (in Einstein’s synchronization); t’ = t
0
’ + x/c
+
  (in the non-standard synchronization). Setting the time at the origin (when the light is emitted) 
to zero (i.e. t
0
 = t
0
’ = 0), we have t = t’ + x (1/c – 1/c
+
) (for details see, e.g., Zhang 1997, pp. 11-3). This expression leads to ct’ = ct + kx, which is the expression we 
find in page 31 of Anderson and Stedman (1977). This expression together with x’ = x are the coordinate transformations between the standard and non-standard 
coordinate systems defined in the two inertial reference frames. It is important to notice that Anderson and Stedman do not make any reference to the expressions 
for the coordinate time with standard or non-standard definitions of simultaneity.
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Notice that the non-standard synchronization in an 
inertial reference frame is established through a particular 
coordinate transformation (the synchronization or synchrony 
transformation) made from the inertial reference frame O0 
to another inertial reference frame Oκ. We start with the 
coordinate system in O0 corresponding to a standard definition 
of simultaneity and transform to another coordinate system 
in Ok corresponding to a different definition of simultaneity. 
Applying Møller’s terminology in the case of special relativity 
we might call this transformation a gauge transformation 
(Anderson and Stedman 1977, p. 29).7,8 In this approach we 
can see the choice of a particular synchronization as fixing the 
gauge (Anderson, Vetharaniam and Stedman 1998, p. 102).9
The synchrony transformation is the transformation 
considered by Edwards in his work just before the deduction 
of the generalized Lorentz transformations (Edwards 1963, 
p. 485).10 It is important to notice that here we depart in a 
crucial way from Møller’s analogy with the gauge freedom 
of electrodynamics. In Møller’s case, we are considering 
a coordinate transformation within the same reference 
frame; in Edwards’ or Anderson and Stedman’s cases, we are 
considering a transformation between two inertial reference 
frames with different stipulations of distant simultaneity.
The existence of a transformation between the coordinates 
corresponding to different definitions of simultaneity can 
be misinterpreted as a coordinate transformation within an 
inertial reference frame. In particular the adoption in special 
relativity of Møller’s “gauge talk” in the context of general 
relativity might reinforce this misinterpretation, since 
Møller considered “gauge transformations” within the same 
reference frame.
In fact, there were authors that made the point that the 
conventionality of simultaneity might be nothing more than 
a trivial consequence of the coordinate freedom of the theory 
(see, e.g., Mittelstaedt 1977, Friedman 1977).11 These authors’ 
criticism can, in fact, be framed in terms of the synchrony 
transformation (which is the central feature of the gauge 
interpretation of the conventionality of simultaneity): we start 
with the Minkowski space-time in its isotropic formulation 
(Friedman 1977, pp. 417-8), or we consider an inertial 
reference frame with a coordinate system corresponding to 
the standard definition of simultaneity (Mittelstaedt 1977, p. 
574). Then, using the synchrony/gauge transformation, we 
transform to another coordinate system adopted to the same 
time like geodesic (Friedman 1977, pp. 419-22), or the same 
inertial reference frame with a non-standard coordinate 
system K’ (Mittelstaedt 1977, pp. 575-6). Addressing Winnie’s 
work on the thesis of the conventionality of simultaneity, 
Friedman remarked that: 
Winnie’s claim is that special relativity as formulated in 
e-systems is equivalent to special relativity as formulated 
in inertial systems. It seems to me that there is one sense 
in which this claim is obviously true, but completely 
trivial. […] The sense in which the equivalence claim 
is obviously true is that Minkowski space-time can 
be described equally well from the point of view of 
e-coordinate systems as from the point of view of inertial 
coordinate systems. […] Indeed, they are nothing but 
different coordinate representations of the same theory. 
(Friedman 1977, p. 421)
In a similar way, Mittelstaedt’s view was that the 
conventionality of simultaneity is “almost equivalent to the 
free choice of the coordinate system K’ in an inertial system” 
(Mittelstaedt 1977, p. 582). In both cases the authors do not 
take into account that previous to considering a coordinate 
transformation we must have already set a coordinate 
system in the first place. The issue of the conventionality 
of simultaneity occurs here, not on the subsequent 
transformation to another coordinate system.
The lack of an explicit treatment of the setting of coordinates 
with a standard or a non-standard definition of simultaneity 
in relevant works, like the ones by Edwards, Winnie, and 
Anderson and Stedman, does not help in avoiding this kind 
of misinterpretation. We can avoid, at least in part, the risk 
of making this misinterpretation of the conventionality of 
simultaneity thesis by considering the transformation as 
relating the coordinate systems of two different inertial 
reference frames with different definitions of simultaneity. 
That is, the coordinate transformation is not a transformation 
within one reference frame, it simply establishes the relation 
between the coordinate systems of two given inertial 
reference frames. We might, e.g., adopt Zhang’s terminology 
when referring to a coordinate transformation between two 
different inertial reference frames (one with a standard and 
another with a non-standard definition of simultaneity) and 
speak of the “coordinate transformation between Einstein 
and Edwards frames” (Zhang 1997, p. 11).
Anderson and Stedman seem to think of the transformation 
as an active change of the setting of the clocks of the 
adopted inertial reference frame: “the introduction of one-
way [speed of light] anisotropy (O0 → Oκ) is equivalent to 
altering the setting, though not the rate, of the coordinate 
clocks” (Anderson and Stedman 1977, p. 31). This in itself 
does not seem to be a difficulty, even if in this view the 
7 - The adoption of this terminology in special relativity seems a bit awkward. In the case of general relativity the coordinates are also related to the field, and the 
analogy with the case of electrodynamics makes some sense. However, in special relativity the Minkowski space-time is not a field. In a more recent implementa-
tion of a gauge interpretation, Rynasiewicz treats the Minkowski space-time as “a special case of relativistic spacetimes in general” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 92).  In 
fact, it seems that to justify in a more rigorous way the use of “gauge talk” in the context of special relativity, it is necessary to treat special relativity as a special 
case of general relativity for which we impose a “flatness condition” (see, e.g., Rickles 2008; Pooley 2017). This is an important issue on its own, which, however, 
is beyond the limited scope of this work.
8 - In Anderson and Stedman (1992) this approach is extended to the case in which the synchronization parameter κ is a function of position κ(x). 
9 - Making an analogy with electrodynamics we call the choice of one of the possible definitions of simultaneity a fixing of the gauge. In electrodynamics, depend-
ing on the application we are considering, we select different potentials (i.e. we fix the gauge differently) to make the mathematics simpler (see, e.g., Barut 1964, 
pp. 94-5).
10 - Edwards' expression is t' = t – x/c (1 – c/c
+
). Substituting c/2e for c
+
 we obtain t' = t – x/c (1 – 2e), and from this ct' = ct + κx. 
11 - Here, we do not address these works as eventually representative of Mittelstaedt's or Friedman's views on this subject. We simply choose these works since 
they are historically representative (see, e.g., Jammer 2006, p. 254) of what we consider to be a misinterpretation of the conventionality of simultaneity thesis.
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synchrony transformation is presented as actively changing/
transforming a coordinate system. Mathematically, the 
situation is the same as that described above in terms of a 
transformation from an Einstein (isotropic) frame into 
an Edwards (anisotropic) frame. If fact, Anderson and 
Stedman seem to be thinking, in a way that is similar to what 
Rynasiewicz did later (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 93), in terms of 
the (active) implementation of a new inertial reference frame 
with a non-standard definition of simultaneity by changing 
the setting of the clocks. However, by putting the synchrony 
transformation in the central stage regarding the issue of 
the conventionality of simultaneity, Anderson and Stedman 
do not address the “gauge fixing”, i.e. the stipulation of a 
particular definition of simultaneity (or, in other words, the 
initial setting of the clocks). Also, the “gauge freedom” – as 
a way to present the conventionality of simultaneity –, is 
addressed in terms of the application of the active synchrony 
transformation to the adopted coordinate system (which in 
the case of Anderson and Stedman is the standard one), not, 
e.g., in terms of the “freedom” of choosing between different 
definitions of simultaneity that are physically equivalent. 
This approach replaces considering, on an equal footing, 
different inertial reference frames with different definitions 
of simultaneity. In their work Anderson and Stedman 
misplace the locus of the conventionality of simultaneity, 
which is in the definition of simultaneity itself and the partial 
freedom in making this definition, and focus on the secondary 
issue of the mathematical relationship between physically 
equivalent inertial reference frames with different definitions 
of simultaneity.12
4 – Rynasiewicz's “new 
take”: the conventionality 
of simultaneity in terms 
of the action of an active 
diffeomorphism on a Min-
kowski space-time
Anderson and Stedman’s view on the conventionality of 
simultaneity in terms of gauge transformations is based 
on a particular coordinate transformation, the synchrony 
transformation, between two inertial reference frames, which 
we might refer to as the synchrony boost.13 Rynasiewicz also 
makes a case for a gauge interpretation of the conventionality 
of simultaneity. In fact, Rynasiewicz starts, de facto, with 
the synchrony transformation, even if he makes his case 
in terms of the Lorentz local time t’ = t – ϑx/c2, where ϑ = 
c(1 – α)/(1 + α) with α = e/(1 – e), being e the Reichenbach 
epsilon. With a little algebra we find that ϑ = (1 – 2e)/c, 
and from this we obtain t’ = t – (1 – 2e)x/c, which is the 
synchrony transformation adopting a different convention 
for the signature of the metric. A difference between 
Rynasiewicz’s and Anderson and Stedman’s approaches is 
in how we interpret this mathematical expression. In the 
case of Anderson and Stedman we have an (active) boost; 
Rynasiewicz proposes to develop it in terms of the notion of 
an (active) diffeomorphism. 
In philosophical discussions about space-time in relation to 
general relativity, one usually considers the triplet <M, g, 
T>, where M is a four-dimensional manifold, g is a pseudo-
Riemannian metric, and T is the energy-momentum tensor 
(see, e.g. Norton 1988, pp. 56-7). A diffeomorphism is a one-
to-one, onto, and smooth map that assigns to each point of 
a manifold M another point of another manifold N with the 
same dimension (see, e.g., Wald 1984, p. 438). When we 
consider the action of the map in the same manifold we might 
specialize the terminology and call our map an automorphism 
(see, e.g., Stachel and Iftime 2005, p. 6). In what follows 
we will maintain a simplified terminology and just speak of 
“diffeomorphism” when considering a diffeomorphism from 
M → N or from M → M.
In the case of a (passive) coordinate transformation there is 
no action on the points of the manifold: we simply label each 
point with different coordinates. In the case of an (active) 
diffeomorphism we swap points in the manifold maintaining 
the coordinate system (see, e.g., Norton 2005, pp. 84-5). A 
diffeomorphism d induces another map d* that “carries” 
mathematical structures defined on the manifold M at each 
point p to the points dp belonging to N or M. In particular, 
the structures g and T are “carried” under d by d*. In this way, 
under the action of a diffeomorphism we obtain a new triplet 
<M, d*g, d*T> or <N, d*g, d*T> (see, e.g., Norton 1988, pp. 
56-7). We can think of (g, T) and (d*g, d*T) as physically 
equivalent solutions of Einstein’s field equations (see, e.g., 
Wald 1984, p. 438). 
As we have seen, Møller considered a coordinate 
transformation within the same reference frame as a gauge 
transformation. There is another tradition which applies the 
gauge analogy in the context of general relativity: we refer to 
the action of a diffeomorphism as a gauge transformation, 
and we speak of “gauge freedom” in general relativity due 
to the physical equivalence of diffeomorphically related 
solutions of the theory (see, e.g., Wald 1984, p. 438). 
In Rynasiewicz’s approach, the synchrony transformation 
is interpreted in terms of a diffeomorphism d applied to 
the Minkowski space-time <E4, η>, where E4 is a manifold 
diffeomorphic to R4 and η is a Minkowski metric on E4. 
We have: t(dp) = t(p) – (1 – 2e)x(p)/c = t(p) – ϑηx(p)/c2; 
x(dp)= x(p); y(dp) = y(p); z(dp) = z(p). When applying the 
diffeomorphism d to the Minkowski space-time <E4, η > we 
obtain, according to Rynasiewicz, a new Minkowski space-
12 - The same criticism applies, mutatis mutandis, to the gauge interpretation in Anderson and Stedman (1992), in which there is a generalization to the case of a 
local gauge freedom.
13 - Here, “boost” is to be understood as an active action on an inertial reference frame. For example, we can regard the Lorentz boost as an active setting into 
relative motion of an inertial reference frame K' which is initially at rest in relation to another inertial reference frame K (see, e.g., Brown 2005, pp. 28, 30 and 
34).  The (active) synchrony boost corresponds to an active change of the setting of the clocks of an inertial reference frame, which corresponds to implementing a 
“new” inertial reference frame with a different coordinate time. It is in this sense that Anderson and Stedman apply the synchrony transformation. According to 
them, the transformation leads “to altering the setting, though not the rate, of the coordinate clocks” (Anderson and Stedman 1977, p. 31).
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time <E4, d*η>:
We have not simply switched from a coordinate chart 
(t, x, y, z) in which the simultaneity relation is standard 
to a chart (t – ϑx/c2, x, y, z) in which that relation is 
nonstandard. Rather we have used that transformation 
to induce an active point mapping of the Minkowski 
spacetime to a new Minkowski spacetime. (Rynasiewicz 
2012, p. 93)
Rynasiewicz claims that the application of a diffeomorphism 
brings about a new Minkowski space-time with a different 
definition of simultaneity than that we started with (which 
in practice he takes to be the standard definition). This 
would circumvent the accusation that the conventionality of 
simultaneity results from a simple coordinate transformation 
(in the same inertial reference frame) and, therefore, is a 
trivial consequence of the coordinate freedom of physical 
theories.
Rynasiewicz claims that his “new take” on the issue of the 
conventionality of simultaneity, “has the merit of nailing 
the exact sense in which simultaneity is conventional” 
(Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 90). According to him, “It is 
conventional in precisely the same sense in which the 
gauge freedom that arises in the general theory of relativity 
makes the choice between diffeomorphically related models 
conventional” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 90). In general relativity 
<M, g, T> and <M, d*g, d*T> are physically equivalent; we 
have a gauge freedom in the sense that we can choose which 
particular “model” we want (we have the liberty to fix the 
gauge). In a somewhat related way, Rynasiewicz proposes 
to characterize the election between the diffeomorphically 
related space-times <E4, η> and <E4, d*η>, which are 
physically equivalent, in terms of a gauge freedom. The 
existence of diffeomorphisms is taken to be the crucial aspect 
that characterizes in a precise way the exact sense in which 
the definition of simultaneity is conventional.
In what follows we will analyze some of Rynasiewicz’s 
remarks in relation to this view. We will consider the 
following excerpts:
The original problem, however, was whether there is a 
unique way to draw in the light cones, given the Einstein 
frame-structure. (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 93)
Choices of different standards of simultaneity are 
equivalent to active boosts under local time. Active boosts 
under local time preserve the antecedently given Einstein 
frame-structure but do not preserve light cone structure, 
and hence one-way speeds of light. (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 
94)
The synchronization problem is nothing more than a 
fixing of gauge for flat relativistic spacetime. (Rynasiewicz 
2012, p. 94)
Let us consider the first excerpt. Rynasiewicz defines what 
he calls the Einstein frame-structure by following Einstein’s 
steps in his paper from 1905, where Einstein develops special 
relativity:
Recall the very first steps Einstein takes in developing 
the kinematics of special relativity. […] Initially, we are 
granted an inertial frame F. […] Think of this as just 
an inertial fibration of an R4 manifold. Next, Einstein 
specifies the use of rigid rods and Euclidean geometry in 
order to assign position coordinates to a material point 
at rest [...] think of this as the assignment of a Euclidean 
metric h
ab
 on the space F of fibres. Finally, Einstein 
populates his inertial frame with stationary clocks of 
identical constitution. [...] Thus, we have a temporal 
metric θA on each fibre A ∈ F. (Rynasiewicz 2012, pp. 90-
1)
This is the Einstein frame-structure. At this point, we still do 
not have a coordinate time in the inertial frame, only local 
times at each fibre. It is here, as we have seen, the issue of 
the conventionality in the definition of simultaneity arises. 
Einstein defines the coordinate time, and subsequently the 
notion of distant simultaneity, by stipulating that the time 
a light signal takes when sent from fibre A to fibre B (as 
measured in “A-time” and in “B-time”) is equal to the time 
the light signal takes, when reflected from B, to arrive at A. 
Let tA be the A-time when light is sent from A to B, tB the 
B-time at which the light arrives at B and is reflected back 
towards A, and tA’ the A-time when the light signal arrives at 
A. We have t
B
 – tA = tA’ – tB. There seems to be no reason not 
to adopt a different stipulation according to Reichenbach’s 
prescription: t
B
 = tA + e(tA’ – tA), where 0 < e < 1. As we can 
see in Edwards (1963), each of these choices of coordinate 
time leads to a different light cone structure. In particular a 
definition of simultaneity for which e ≠ ½, implies that the 
light speeds on the positive and negative direction of the 
x-axis are not identical. This leads to a tilting in the light cone 
structure. Rynasiewicz calls this the “original problem”: there 
does not seem to be a unique way to “draw in” the light cones 
as they seem to result from the conventional adoption of a 
particular definition of simultaneity. A question we can pose 
at this point is how does Rynasiewicz’s “new take” deal with 
the “original problem”? To start to address this question let 
us consider the second selected excerpt:
Choices of different standards of simultaneity are 
equivalent to active boosts under local time. Active boosts 
under local time preserve the antecedently given Einstein 
frame-structure but do not preserve light cone structure, 
and hence one-way speeds of light. (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 
94)
Rynasiewicz equates the “choices of different standards of 
simultaneity” with “active boosts under local time”, which he 
interprets as the action of a diffeomorphism on a Minkowski 
space-time <E4, η>. The diffeomorphism does not affect 
the Einstein frame-structure but it does change the light 
cone structure, corresponding according to Rynasiewicz 
to having a new Minkowski space-time <E4, d*η>. As it is, 
Rynasiewicz’s approach seems to give a preferred position 
to the standard Minkowski space-time <E4, η>, and then 
equates the “choices of different standards of simultaneity” 
to a transformation into a new Minkowski space-time <E4, 
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d* η >. We think this is not the case. Rynasiewicz seems to 
adopt the standard Minkowski space-time for simplicity, but 
he considers that the standard and non-standard Minkowski 
space-times are on an equal footing. Rynasiewicz mentions 
that “there is a complete symmetry between [<E4, η>] and 
[<E4, d*η>]” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 92); we think it is implicit 
in Rynasiewicz’s view that we could start with a Minkowski 
space-time with a non-standard definition of simultaneity 
and then consider a diffeomorphism to another space-time 
with another definition of simultaneity, standard or non-
standard. However, we should take stock of the fact that we 
have to start already with a choice of simultaneity previous 
to applying the diffeomorphism to the Minkowski space-time 
<E4, η’>; that is, we need in the first place to complete the 
Einstein frame-structure with a definition of simultaneity – 
we need to “draw in” the light cone structure –  so that we 
actually have a Minkowski space-time <E4, η’>. By nailing 
down the sense in which the notion of simultaneity is 
conventional in terms of the diffeomorphically related space-
times, Rynasiewicz ignores a necessary element of what he 
calls the “original problem”: to address the “problem” of 
the uniqueness or not of the light cone structure, we need 
to consider the “construction” of a light cone structure “on 
top” of the Einstein frame-structure. When identifying the 
“choices of different standards of simultaneity” with the 
application of a diffeomorphism, Rynasiewicz does not deal 
with the definition of a Minkowski space-time <E4, η’> by 
stipulating a light cone structure previous to any application 
of a diffeomorphism.
To further address what seems to be an excessive emphasis, 
in Rynasiewicz’s approach, on the notion of diffeomorphism 
and a lack of treatment of the completion of a Minkowski 
space-time from the Einstein frame-structure, let us consider 
the third selected excerpt:
The synchronization problem is nothing more than a 
fixing of gauge for flat relativistic spacetime. (Rynasiewicz 
2012, p. 94)
We can rephrase “the synchronization problem” as “the non-
uniqueness problem in the definition of simultaneity”; it is 
another terminology of what Rynasiewicz called the “original 
problem” of seemingly having a non-unique way to “draw in 
the light cone”.  Rynasiewicz says that the non-uniqueness 
problem in the definition of simultaneity can be framed in 
terms of a fixing of the gauge in the Minkowski space-time. 
In the context of special relativity, “fixing the gauge”, as 
applied by Rynasiewicz, means choosing the definition of 
simultaneity between several equally valid possibilities, 
which for simplicity is usually the standard definition. Here, 
the conventionality of simultaneity is “nailed down” not in 
terms of the application of a diffeomorphism to an already 
constructed Minkowski space-time, but in terms of the 
completion of the Einstein frame-structure by a particular 
adoption of a definition of simultaneity (i.e. by fixing the 
gauge), in a context in which different definitions are equally 
valid (i.e. where we have gauge freedom). That is, the 
conventionality of simultaneity is addressed at the level of the 
constitution of the Minkowski space-time.
As it is, there seems to be a dissonance and even tension, 
among several of Rynasiewicz’s remarks. If we only take 
into account the second excerpt, the diffeomorphism has the 
central role, and the conventionality seems to result from the 
existence of different diffeomorphisms that can be applied 
to a selected Minkowski space-time. This part does not deal 
directly with what Rynasiewicz’s calls the “synchronization 
problem” or “original problem”, i.e. whether there is a unique 
way to “draw in” the light cones given the Einstein frame-
structure. A diffeomorphism does not “draw in” a light cone; 
according to Rynasiewicz, it transforms an already given 
light cone. Also, the third excerpt seems to provide a different 
characterization of the conventionality of simultaneity in 
which the definition of simultaneity is presented as a fixing 
of the gauge.
We think it makes better sense if we change the “relative 
weight” of the notions employed and give a different narrative 
sequencing to Rynasiewicz’s remarks. It could be something 
along the following lines:
When stipulating different definitions of simultaneity —
one standard and another non-standard — we arrive at two 
physically equivalent Minkowski space-times <E4, η> and 
<E4, η’>.  These are related by a diffeomorphism, i.e. <E4, η’> 
= <E4, d*η>. Thinking in terms of gauge freedom, we have 
the liberty to complete the Einstein frame-structure with 
different light cone structures by fixing the gauge (i.e. by 
making a stipulation of simultaneity). Minkowski space-times 
with different light cone structures are diffeomorphically 
related; we can say that the diffeomorphisms “comprise the 
gauge freedom” of the theory (see, e.g. Wald 1984, p. 438). 
This means, in particular, that if we initially fix the gauge 
to the standard one (i.e. we adopt a Minkowski space-time 
with an isotropic light cone structure), we can, applying a 
diffeomorphism, cover the entire span of possible Minkowski 
space-times with anisotropic light cone structures, i.e. 
applying a diffeomorphism we obtain a new anisotropic 
Minkowski space-time physically equivalent to the one 
initially “constructed” when fixing the gauge.
We think that by reframing Rynasiewicz’s gauge interpretation 
along these lines we avoid (part of) the tensions present in the 
paper.14 The notion of diffeomorphism exits centre stage and 
we focus on how to “draw in the light cone” as the central 
aspect, which in a gauge interpretation can be seen as a 
“gauge fixing” in a situation where there is “gauge freedom”, 
i.e. where we can “draw in the light cone” in different ways 
that are physically equivalent.
The original or synchronization “problem” occurs when 
completing the Einstein frame-structure, by defining the 
light cone structure (i.e. by a particular fixing of the “gauge”), 
which corresponds to establishing a coordinate time. We 
notice that Minkowski space-times with different light cone 
structures are physically equivalent We can address this, 
e.g., in terms of having a “gauge freedom” in the stipulation 
of the one-way speed of light. In this way, the original or 
synchronization problem can be characterized without 
making any reference to the notion of a diffeomorphism. 
14 - That this is not completely the case will be seen at the beginning of the next section.
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We can, however, characterize the change between different 
physically equivalent definitions of simultaneity in terms of 
the application of a diffeomorphism to a selected Minkowski 
space-time (corresponding to a particular definition of 
simultaneity). This is, so to speak, a partial approach to the 
original or synchronization problem as formulated in the 
first excerpt we have considered: interpreted as an active 
transformation of the light cone structure, the application 
of a diffeomorphism shows that we can produce different 
light cone structures. However, the application of a 
diffeomorphism does not enable to “draw in the light cones”, 
only to “redraw” them from an initially given light cone 
structure.
5 – The Novelty (or not) 
of Rynasiewicz's gauge 
interpretation and his response 
to objections to the conven-
tionality of simultaneity thesis
Rynasiewicz’s objective with his approach can be seen as 
two-fold. In his own words, his purpose is “to reconstruct 
rationally the sense in which Einstein claimed that 
simultaneity is conventional” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94).15 
Also, this should provide a “different rationale for taking 
seriously the conventionality of simultaneity than any that 
have appeared before” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94). We can 
consider the following excerpt as an example of his “new” 
rationale: 
There are certainly things about the conformal structure 
of Minkowski spacetime that are not conventional (e.g., 
that it’s flat). But the choice between the many different 
representations of conformal structure on the manifold 
certainly is conventional, and what differs between those 
various representations is the one-way speed of light in a 
given chart adapted to the Einstein frame-structure. That 
is the exact sense in which simultaneity is conventional. 
(Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94)16
As it stands, Rynasiewicz’s approach does not seem to give 
a “new rationale” regarding the issue of the conventionality 
of simultaneity. We know, at least, since Einstein’s work 
from 1905 that the definition of simultaneity is a stipulation 
that does not bear on the factual content of the theory. 
Einstein established by definition that the time needed 
for light to travel from a point A to a point B is the same 
it takes to travel from B to A (Einstein 1905, p. 142). This 
corresponds to assuming that the propagation of light is 
isotropic. This is made more explicit in a later paper: “we 
shall now stipulate that the velocity of the propagation of 
light in vacuum from some point A to some point B is the 
same as that from B to A” (Einstein 1911, p. 345).17 With 
Reichenbach’s and Grünbaum’s work it becomes clear 
that we can adopt different definitions of simultaneity 
corresponding to different one-way speeds of light, and that 
they are physically equivalent. Paraphrasing Rynasiewicz 
we might say that what differs in the different definitions of 
simultaneity is the adopted one-way speed of light. In fact, 
the rationale contained in the above excerpt can be found, 
with a different terminology, basically in Edwards (1963): 
there are mathematical quantities that are directly observable 
and others not. Some of the non-observable mathematical 
quantities depend on the stipulation of the one-way speed 
of light. However, observable quantities do not depend on 
this stipulation. In this way, there is no observable difference 
when adopting an isotropic or an anisotropic speed of light – 
we can say that this choice is conventional. When adopting an 
anisotropic speed of light, the light cone structure is different 
from the one corresponding to the isotropic case. We have an 
anisotropic space-time. The light cone structure is the only 
difference between isotropic and anisotropic space-times 
(and we can transform from one case to the other by applying 
a transformation to the time coordinate).
It is true that Rynasiewicz further develops this approach 
using the terminology of gauge transformations and 
applying the mathematics of differential geometry, in a 
context of considering that “the case of distinct Minkowski 
spacetimes related by a diffeomorphism is just a special case 
of relativistic spacetimes in general” (Rynasiewicz 2012, 
p. 92). Rynasiewicz’s use of the notion of “Einstein frame-
structure” is particularly helpful in making the distinction 
between what changes and what does not change with a 
different stipulation of the one-way speed of light. In this 
15 - Einstein mentioned that the synchronization of distant clocks was established by definition (Einstein 1905, p. 142), or by stipulation (Einstein 1911, p. 345). Einstein's definition 
of simultaneity rests on taking the one-way speed of light to be isotropic. In his book from 1917, he noticed that we are facing a logical circle, since “an examination of this sup-
position [regarding the one-way speed of light] would only be possible if we already had at our disposal the means of measuring time. It would thus appear as though we were 
moving here in a logical circle” (Einstein 1917, p. 272). Einstein never explored, as Reichenbach did, different definitions of simultaneity. However, we can consider Einstein as the 
forerunner of Reichenbach in his work on what become known as the conventionality of simultaneity thesis (see, e.g.  Reichenbach 1920, pp. 9-10). In fact, Einstein subscribed to 
Reichenbach's development of his remarks. In a review of Reichenbach's 1927 book, Einstein emphasized Reichenbach's treatment of the conventionality of simultaneity: “special 
care has been taken to ferret out clearly what in the relativistic definition of simultaneity is a logically arbitrary decree and what in it is a hypothesis, i.e. an assumption about 
the constitution of nature”(cited in Jammer 2006, p. 191). When Rynasiewicz writes that his purpose is to provide a new rationale to the “sense in which Einstein claimed that 
simultaneity is conventional” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94), he is in fact referring to what we have called the “tradition”, which was inspired by Einstein but actually developed by 
Reichenbach, Grünbaum, and followers.
16 - Returning to the issue of the previous section, notice how in this excerpt Rynasiewicz does not even characterize the conventionality in terms of “gauge fixing”: we have dif-
ferent representations of the conformal structure, which are all physically equivalent, and the only difference between them is how we “draw in” the light cone (corresponding to 
different one-way speeds of light). We are free to choose any one of them. This is, according to this excerpt, the exact sense in which simultaneity is conventional.
17 - Previous to special relativity, Poincaré had already mentioned that the notion of simultaneity involved assumptions and the isotropy of light was a stipulation (Poincaré 1898; 
see also Jammer 2006, pp.101-2).
9N° 2   2018
Vol. 5
The GauGe InTerpreTa-
TIon of The ConvenTIo-
nalITy of SImulTaneITy
way, Rynasiewicz’s work can be seen as belonging to the 
same “tradition” as Edwards’ 1963 essay.
We can also see Rynasiewicz’s paper as part of another 
“tradition” initiated by Anderson and Stedman (also related 
to Reichenbach’s, Grünbaum’s, Edwards’, and Winnie’s 
works) that proposes to address the conventionality of 
simultaneity in terms of a gauge interpretation. Here, the 
use of the term “new” to characterize Rynasiewicz’s work 
might make even less sense. In a way similar to what 
Rynasiewicz wrote later, in a review paper on the issue of 
the conventionality of simultaneity, Anderson, Vetharaniam, 
and Stedman considered the possibility of having different 
definitions of simultaneity as a “gauge freedom” (Anderson, 
Vetharaniam and Stedman 1998, p. 98). The authors used the 
term “re-coordinatization” to refer to a new coordinatization 
of time and associate it to a “gauge transformation” – the 
synchrony transformation (Anderson, Vetharaniam and 
Stedman 1998, p. 98). Also, the authors called the choice 
of a particular definition of simultaneity a “gauge fixing” 
(Anderson, Vetharaniam and Stedman 1998, p. 144).
If we consider the second of Rynasiewicz’s excerpts 
considered above, it could equally be part of Anderson and 
Stedman’s 1977 paper. As we have seen they made their 
case in terms of an (active) boost that “[alters] the setting, 
though not the rate, of the coordinate clocks” (Anderson and 
Stedman 1977, p. 31).  Rynasiewicz’s view of the action of 
diffeomorphisms is that: 
Choices of different standards of simultaneity are 
equivalent to active boosts under local time [(i.e. the 
action of a diffeomorphism)]. Active boosts under local 
time preserve the antecedently given Einstein frame-
structure but do not preserve light cone structure, and 
hence one-way speeds of light. (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94)
Rephrasing this sentence more in line with Anderson and 
Stedman’s paper we might have something like this: 
Choices of different standards of simultaneity are equivalent 
to active synchrony boosts. Active boosts preserve the 
antecedently given system of rods and clocks constituting 
an inertial reference frame but do not preserve the setting, 
though not the rate, of the coordinate clocks, and hence one-
way speeds of light.
We have basically the same scheme with Anderson and 
Stedman (1977) and Anderson, Vetharaniam and Stedman 
(1998) as that adopted by Rynasiewicz (2012); the difference 
is in the mathematics employed: where Anderson and co-
workers employ a coordinate transformation between two 
inertial reference frames with a different coordinatization 
of time, interpreted as a boost, Rynasiewicz employs 
the notions of manifold and active diffeomorphism. By 
fixing the gauge (i.e. by adopting a particular definition of 
simultaneity), we define the coordinate time in an inertial 
reference frame or we complete the Einstein frame-structure 
with a particular stipulation of light cone structure obtaining 
a Minkowski space-time. The gauge freedom of the theory 
can be seen by applying a gauge/synchrony transformation 
or a diffeomorphism so that we transform into a new inertial 
reference frame with a different gauge fixing (which we can 
see, e.g., as a different coordinate time) or a new Minkowski 
space-time with a different gauge fixing (i.e. a different light 
cone structure corresponding, e.g., to a different coordinate 
time).
While Rynasiewicz does not cite them, his work can be 
seen as a continuation of Edwards (1963) and Anderson and 
Stedman (1977). That his approach might not be as “new” as 
his author thinks is not, in our view, a defect in any way. In 
fact, we think that there are several virtues in Rynasiewicz’s 
work. One of them is that it addresses and dispels the 
misinterpretation of the conventionality of simultaneity 
as due to a trivial coordinate transformation.  The use by 
Rynasiewicz of terms like “active boost” or “active point 
mapping” stresses that we are not considering a passive 
coordinate transformation within the same inertial reference 
frame, but that we face an altogether different situation. In 
fact, Rynasiewicz’s forcefully argues against the view that 
the conventionality of simultaneity is nothing but a trivial 
consequence of coordinate freedom, by stressing that when 
applying a diffeomorphism we have not “simply switched” 
between coordinate systems but that the transformation is 
applied to “induce an active point mapping of the Minkowski 
spacetime to a new Minkowski spacetime” (Rynasiewicz 
2012, p. 93). As we have seen, it is not necessary to make 
reference to the notion of diffeomorphism to present 
this view. It can be made in terms almost identical by 
referring to the synchrony boost. More than this, we can 
dispel this misinterpretation simply by considering what 
Rynasiewicz called the synchronization or original problem. 
By considering the “drawing in” of the light cone (or, 
equivalently, the establishing of a coordinate time) it is clear 
that we are dealing with a coordinatization of space-time, not 
with a transformation of coordinates.
Rynasiewicz also considers other objections to the 
conventionality of simultaneity thesis. Here, we will not 
go into details regarding these objections, neither will we 
make an analysis of Rynasiewicz’s response to them. To 
our purpose, it is only necessary to see how Rynasiewicz 
articulates his response to the objections. The point is how 
much of the gauge interpretation plays a crucial role in 
Rynasiewicz’s defense of the conventionality of simultaneity 
thesis in light of these objections.
Regarding the objection that the adoption of an anisotropic 
speed of light results from adding a further gratuitous 
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structure to the Minkowski space-time (Friedman 1983, p. 
312), and because of that we should adopt the Minkowski 
space-time with the standard definition, Rynasiewicz notes 
that: 
This would be true if we attempted to define simultaneity 
only after having fixed the light cone structure on 
spacetime. But as we have seen, the problem of defining 
simultaneity is equivalent to the problem of determining 
how to draw the light cones in spacetime after having 
been given an Einstein frame-structure on the spacetime. 
(Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 93)
Here, Rynasiewicz makes his point in terms of what he called 
the synchronization or original problem. We deal with the 
objection by making clear that we do not have an isotropic 
Minkowski space-time to start with but the Einstein frame-
structure. At this point, there is no fixed light cone structure, 
we have to define it. The anisotropic case does not have any 
more structure than the isotropic case, both are defined in 
equivalent ways, by “drawing in” the light cones in space-
time.  Rynasiewicz makes his case without using the notion 
of “diffeomorphism” or “gauge freedom”. In fact, he does 
not even need to make an explicit reference to the notion of 
“gauge fixing”.
A similar situation occurs regarding another objection to 
the conventionality of simultaneity thesis. Malament (1977) 
made a strong case against the conventionality thesis in 
terms of a uniqueness theorem that would show that the 
standard definition of simultaneity is the only one compatible 
with causal relations of special relativity. According to 
Rynasiewicz:
Malament’s result, however, has simply been misapplied 
to the problem of the conventionality of simultaneity. 
For the result presupposes that we first fix the light cone 
structure, i.e., the one-way speeds of light, and then ask 
what simultaneity relations are definable from this. And 
obviously the standard relation is uniquely definable from 
this. The original problem, however, was whether there is 
a unique way to draw in the light cones, given the Einstein 
frame-structure. If we draw the cones in with anisotropic 
one-way velocities, that also defines a unique, but non-
standard simultaneity relation. (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 93)
Again, Rynasiewicz makes his case without an explicit resort 
to his gauge interpretation. The three objections are all dealt 
with in the same way: we only have the Einstein frame-
structure at the beginning. By “drawing in” the light cone and 
completing a Minkowski space-time we have established a 
coordinate time and defined a notion of distant simultaneity 
(and it turns out that the “drawing in” of the light cone is 
not uniquely determined). According to Rynasiewicz, the 
three objections result from a misunderstanding of this fact. 
We see that the three objections considered by Rynasiewicz 
can be addressed in terms of the “drawing in” of the light 
cone structure. The gauge interpretation has no crucial role 
in how Rynasiewicz addresses the objections. In fact, as 
mentioned, the central role given to the synchrony boost or 
the diffeomorphism in gauge interpretations has the danger 
of hiding the synchronization problem, i.e. the “drawing in” 
of the light cone in a context in which there seems to be no 
unique way to do it.
6 – Conclusion: why we 
find gauge interpretations 
of the conventionality of 
simultaneity unconvincing
In this paper, we made a critical reassessment of gauge 
interpretations of the conventionality of simultaneity. We have 
considered the historical locus of the gauge interpretation, 
Anderson and Stedman paper from 1977, and a recent work 
by Rynasiewicz from 2012. While Rynasiewicz believes that 
he offers a “new take” on the issue, we cannot agree with this 
view.  Rynasiewicz’s work is too close to previous efforts, 
in particular Edwards’ paper and the gauge interpretation of 
Anderson and Stedman, to be considered “new”. 
Rynasiewicz’s gauge interpretation seems to share with the 
previous work by Anderson and Stedman what we might call 
a structural problem. By “nailing down” the exact sense in 
which the definition of simultaneity is conventional in terms 
of the application of a diffeomorphism to a Minkowski 
space-time, it pushes into the background the issue of the 
“fixing of the gauge” in a context in which there seems to 
be a “gauge freedom”, i.e. it does not address how to “draw 
in” the light cones and the partial freedom to do it.  This 
is, mutatis mutandis, the case of Anderson and Stedman’s 
gauge interpretation. Simply we adopt a somewhat different 
mathematical framework, and, as we have seen, instead 
of considering “gauge transformations” in terms of active 
diffeomorphisms we consider them in terms of active boosts 
(or synchrony transformations). In this way, in our view, the 
gauge interpretations of the conventionality of simultaneity, 
do not, in their present formulation, provide a better 
understanding or a better “rationale” of the conventionality 
of simultaneity than the “traditional” formulation of 
Reichenbach, Grünbaum, and others. This is the case 
even for our tentative reframing of Rynasiewicz’s gauge 
interpretation in terms of the equating of “gauge fixing” with 
the “drawing in” of the light cone structure and considering 
this “gauge fixing” in a context of “gauge freedom” as the 
central theme. This reframing of Rynasiewicz’s position 
avoids (partially) the tensions existing in his text, in which 
we find contradictory remarks with different emphasis on 
different notions (the application of diffeomorphisms; the 
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synchronization or central problem, i.e. the non-uniqueness 
in “drawing in” the light cone; the “drawing in” of the 
light cone as a gauge fixing). However, calling “gauge 
fixing” to the completion of the Einstein frame-structure by 
stipulation a particular light cone structure does not provide 
any deeper “insight” into the issue of the conventionality of 
simultaneity. It only provokes us to go astray by using the 
gauge terminology of “gauge freedom”, “gauge fixing” and 
particularly “gauge transformation” or “diffeomorphism”. 
In fact, reframing Rynasiewicz’s position in terms of the 
“gauge fixing” does not completely “wipe out” tensions 
that are present in his remarks. As mentioned, Rynasiewicz 
even writes that “the exact sense in which simultaneity is 
conventional” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94), is that we can 
choose 
between the many different representations of conformal 
structure on the manifold ... and what differs between 
those various representations is the one-way speed of 
light in a given chart adapted to the Einstein frame-
structure. (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94)18
We see from this excerpt that there is no need for, and 
Rynasiewicz does not employ, any “gauge talk” to present 
“the exact sense in which simultaneity is conventional”. 
This characterization of the conventionality of simultaneity 
is basically the one we can find in the works of Reichenbach, 
Grünbaum, and, particularly, Edwards, whose work 
made explicit that the different definitions of simultaneity 
correspond to different light cones, without being any 
observational difference arising with the adoption of 
a different one-way speed of light (i.e. the adoption of 
a different light cone structure). We see that regarding 
Rynasiewicz’s purpose of “[reconstructing] rationally 
the sense in which Einstein claimed that simultaneity is 
conventional” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94), his approach does 
not go beyond the “tradition”. In fact, as we have seen it can 
lead to difficulties due to the central role that was given to 
the notion of a diffeomorphism.
Regarding the other related objective of his work, which 
was to provide a “different rationale for taking seriously 
the conventionality of simultaneity than any that have 
appeared before” (Rynasiewicz 2012, p. 94), the defense 
made by Rynasiewicz does not, in fact, depends on his gauge 
interpretation, so it does not provide a better “rationale” than 
the one given by the “tradition”. Of the three objections to 
the conventionality of simultaneity thesis considered by 
Rynasiewicz, only the first is dealt with by making reference 
to the notion of a diffeomorphism. This, as mentioned, is 
unnecessary, and the objection can be addressed in terms 
of the “drawing in” of the light cone. In fact, as we have 
seen, Rynasiewicz addresses the other two objections in 
this way, not using directly the gauge interpretation. If as 
Janis remarks, Rynasiewicz made “a vigorous defense of 
conventionality” (Janis 2014), it is our view that if this is so, 
it would be more a merit of the author than a consequence 
of the use of the gauge interpretation. In conclusion, as they 
stand, at the present time, the gauge interpretations of the 
conventionality of simultaneity do not seem to supersede the 
“tradition” as formulated by Reichenbach, Grünbaum, and 
others.
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